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Abstract Some have objected to human enhancement
on the grounds that it violates the autonomy of the
enhanced. These objections, however, overlook the
interesting possibility that autonomy itself could be
enhanced. How, exactly, to enhance autonomy is a
difficult problem due to the numerous and diverse
accounts of autonomy in the literature. Existing ac-
counts of autonomy enhancement rely on narrow and
controversial conceptions of autonomy. However, we
identify one feature of autonomy common to many
mainstream accounts: reasoning ability. Autonomy
can then be enhanced by improving people’s reasoning
ability, in particular through cognitive enhancement;
given how valuable autonomy is usually taken to be,
this gives us extra reason to pursue such cognitive
enhancements. Moreover, autonomy-based objections
will be especially weak against such enhancements. As
we will argue, those who are worried that enhance-
ments will inhibit people’s autonomy should actually
embrace those enhancements that will improve
autonomy.
Keywords Autonomy . Enhancement . Reasoning .
Cognition
Introduction
Recent years have seen a rapid advancement in re-
search that could, now or in the near future, allow for
significant enhancement of various human capacities.
Yet some scholars have leveled objections at various
means of biomedical enhancement, in particular the
alteration of the genes of prospective children. The
perceived ills of biomedical enhancement include di-
minishment of authenticity [1], widespread social strat-
ification and inequity [2], threats to human nature and
dignity [3, 4], and hubristic rejection of ‘the given’ [5].
One further objection, the focus of the present paper, is
that biological enhancement can potentially undermine
the autonomy of the enhanced individuals. Thus,
Jurgen Habermas writes, “Eugenic programming of
desirable traits and dispositions…gives rise to moral
misgivings as soon as it commits the person concerned
to a specific life-project or, in any case, puts specific
restrictions on his freedom to choose a life of his own”
[6, p. 61]. Deena Davis has similarly objected to some
enhancement of children on the grounds that it limits
children’s future options [7, 8].
Yet these autonomy-based concerns overlook the
potential versatility of enhancement technologies. Tra-
ditionally, the enhancement debate has focused on
improving things like health, longevity, intelligence,
beauty or skill; however, as we will argue, autonomy is
itself something that can be enhanced. In fact, autono-
my enhancement is a typical by-product of one of the
interventions Habermas and others object to: cognitive
enhancement. This is not to equate autonomy with
cognition or reasoning capacity; rather, we will argue
that cognition and reasoning capacity can significantly
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to how such interventions might improve autonomy,
we will not only show how certain objections to genet-
ic enhancement can be resisted, but also present an
important yet often-overlooked reason to support re-
search and implementation of certain forms of human
enhancement.1
In the following, we will argue that interventions to
enhance autonomy are feasible on a wide variety of
conceptions of autonomy. Then, we will discuss how
cognitive enhancement will generally also enhance
people’s autonomy, no matter what (plausible) theory
of autonomy one adopts. Finally, we will discuss how
this conclusion can help diffuse some autonomy-based
objections to enhancement in general, and genetic cog-
nitive enhancement in particular. This reflects a general
strategy for defenders of human enhancement: objec-
tions that human enhancement interferes with some
important goods can often be met by showing that
those goods themselves can be promoted via certain
forms of enhancement.
The idea that autonomy can be enhanced is not
entirely new. One might try to promote autonomy, for
example, by removing common psychological biases
[10]. What is new is the prospect that autonomy could
be enhanced by biomedical means. Two of us have
already pointed out in past work that certain psycholog-
ical capacities are necessary for autonomy, and could be
enhanced using genetic selection [11]. The present paper
significantly expands on that earlier argument.
Levy and Juth have recently also addressed the
possibility of enhancing autonomy [12, 13]. However,
as will be explained below, their discussion is narrower
and less likely to be persuasive to many who do not
share their particular views on autonomy. They also do
not directly address the implications of such autonomy
enhancement to autonomy-based objections to en-
hancement. This paper will, then, address important
aspects of autonomy enhancement that have not yet
received attention in the literature.2
The Prospect of Enhancing Autonomy
Diversity in Accounts of Autonomy
The primary difficulty in developing a case for enhanc-
ing autonomy is that there is deep philosophical dis-
agreement as to what autonomy actually is, to say
nothing of why it is valuable.
According to Kantianism, for instance, autonomy is
an aspect of the will: it does not just cause one to act,
but is also itself uncaused; it, moreover, involves at-
tending to substantive normative principles that give
rise to reasons for action [15]. While uncaused causa-
tion is not essential to a Kantian framework [16], a
substantive conception of the will (and hence autono-
my) that involves commitment to certain views of
moral reasoning is crucial. It gives rise to a normatively
non-neutral picture of autonomy on which autonomous
judgment amounts to attending to normative reasons,
which in turn ground obligation [17]. That is not to say
that one only acts autonomously when one acts moral-
ly; rather, autonomous action is defined by something
like an attempt to respond to the (normative) reasons
that there are, in particular, universalized normative
principles.
A competing hierarchical conception of autonomy
originates in the work of Harry Frankfurt [18]. While
Frankfurt technically did not mention autonomy (in-
stead focusing on freedom), his views are widely taken
to be applicable to the concept. Frankfurt drew a dis-
tinction between two crucially different sorts of desires:
first-order desires, which cover most cases of desiring
(desiring to eat, to sleep, to be smart, to win the lottery,
1 There is more than one way to understand the concept of
enhancement (see [9] for an opinionated review). In what fol-
lows, we will largely focus on biomedical (and other) interven-
tions that increase the capacities that (we will argue) underpin
autonomy in normal healthy individuals. On some conceptions
of enhancement, it needs to involve increase in value, or be
beneficial to the enhanced person. Since it is widely held that
autonomy is valuable, the interventions we will discuss would
clearly count as enhancements on this conception. Other, more
value-neutral conceptions understand enhancement in terms of
improvement in some capacity, when that improvement is above
some minimal threshold level. The interventions we consider
should also count as enhancements on this approach as well.
But in any event, the interventions we will consider would
clearly be seen as enhancements by the proponents of the
autonomy-based arguments against enhancement that we will
consider later in this paper.
2 It has been suggested by John Harris that cognitive enhance-
ments could effectively work as indirect moral enhancements
[14]. Improving autonomy, however, is importantly distinct from
enhancing morality. While autonomous action is relevant to
morality (in particular, when responsibility is being ascribed),
there is not much reason to think that making someone more
moral will, as a matter of course, make that person more auton-
omous. And even if such a case could be made, it will not be
explored in this paper.
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etc.); and second-order (and higher) desires, which are
desires to have a certain desire. Autonomy is a particular
sort of coherence between these two forms of desires (or
related states like judgments, preferences, plans, etc.).3
Another loosely-affiliated group of alternative con-
ceptions of autonomy seek to distinguish themselves
from hierarchical views, but retain such views’ empha-
sis on agents’ internal psychological integration and
immunity from manipulative influences. Beauchamp
and Childress [22] in attempting to find a broadly
acceptable account, characterize autonomy by inten-
tionality, understanding and absence of controlling
influences. Similarly, Bernofsky [23] takes autonomy
to consist in competence and individuality. According
to these views, a general comprehension of one’s ac-
tions and the facts germane to that action is central to
autonomy.4
The diversity of accounts of autonomy presents a
difficulty for any attempt to defend the prospect of
enhancing people’s autonomy. One could appeal to
one of the above theories of autonomy, or (more am-
bitiously) craft a new theory, but then one’s account
would only be acceptable to that (potentially narrow)
group who accept a given controversial account. Those
who disagree with the account—and, given the level of
disagreement in the literature on autonomy, there will
be many—would not be convinced.
This presents a serious problem for the few previous
attempts to develop the idea that autonomy could be
enhanced. This idea is discussed by Niklas Juth [12]
and Neil Levy [13], but their understanding of auton-
omy conflicts with many theories of autonomy. In
particular, Juth and Levy both endorse efficacy (ability
to act on and carry out one’s goals and desires) as a
necessary condition of autonomy, but this condition
(which has a notably external character) is not found
in any of the mainstream conceptions of autonomy
surveyed above. Autonomy is, on those views, clearly
distinct from instrumental rationality. In addition,
Juth’s account faces difficulties because another of
his specified conditions for autonomy, authenticity, is
a notoriously vague and underspecified notion, making
the task of elucidating how autonomy might be en-
hanced quite difficult. Levy’s account is more succinct,
but his discussion of autonomy enhancement is some-
what undeveloped (it appears in the context of a
broader discussion of removing cognitive biases) and
does not fully engage with the wider literature on
autonomy. These difficulties not only make Juth and
Levy’s accounts somewhat less persuasive, but also
make it difficult to use themwhen engaging with critics
of enhancement; if one is not clear about what auton-
omy is, it will be difficult to adjudicate whether en-
hancement infringes on autonomy.
Two of us [25] have gestured towards the psycho-
logical alterations that would be necessary for en-
hancement of autonomy, but our discussion is sche-
matic and brief. What we need, then, is not a full
account of autonomy, but rather a substantive under-
standing of the features common to all (or at least most)
plausible conceptions of autonomy. Once these fea-
tures have been identified, one generally-acceptable
way to enhance autonomy would simply be to improve
on those features. The result will be an account of
autonomy enhancement that should be convincing no
matter what particular theory of autonomy one adopts.
This method of finding an overlapping consensus is
quite common in applied ethics, and can have very
useful results; for example, there is a great deal of
philosophical disagreement over the nature of well-
being, but discussions of practical improvements
in people’s well-being is possible because of the
overlapping consensus among those various theories
when it comes to many substantive questions about
3 Of course, this coherence can and has been be cashed out in a
number of different ways by proponents of hierarchical views.
David Richards, for instance, refers to autonomy as the capacity
to “develop, want to act on, and act on higher-order plans of
action which take as their self-critical object one’s life and the
way it is lived” [19, p. 6]. This emphasis on a life-plan bears
some relation to Young’s [20] holistic conception of autonomy,
but unlike Young, Richards (following Frankfurt) emphasizes
the need for one to be able to endorse (rather than simply express
or be aware of) one’s life-plan. Similarly, Gerald Dworkin argues
autonomy is “a second-order capacity of persons to reflect crit-
ically upon their first-order preferences, desires, wishes, and so
forth and the capacity to accept or attempt to change these in light
of higher-order preferences and values” [21, p. 20]. This, impor-
tantly, requires that those capacities be independent, to a certain
degree—free from distorting influences like deception and
manipulation.
4 There are, of course, further accounts of autonomy besides
these. John Christman [24], for example, claims that assent to
the process by which one came to have one’s dispositions and
desires is essential to autonomy, while Robert Young [20] instead
conceives of autonomy in terms of the unity of one’s life-plans.
And Jurgen Habermas [6], whose account will be discussed in
greater detail below, interprets autonomy as self-authorship, the
capacity to guide one’s own emotional and intellectual growth.
There is also a dispute among various authors as to whether
autonomy is a feature of persons [20, 21], actions [22, 24], or
the will [15, 17].
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well-being. As we will see, a similar sort of substantive
overlapping consensus can be found for autonomy and
applied to the particular issue of enhancement.5
Overlapping Consensus: The Theoretical Approach
Despite the various theoretical differences discussed
above, there is considerable agreement among the var-
ious theories of autonomy explicated above concerning
certain features of autonomy. These features will not
constitute a full account of autonomy. Rather, the fea-
tures are generally-accepted constituents of autonomy,
such that improving on those features is generally
taken to improve people’s autonomy. Enhancement of
autonomy will be shown to be plausible, then, insofar
as those features can be enhanced.
What do the leading conceptions of autonomy have
in common? At the broadest level, autonomy is related
to notions of freedom and self-determination. Howev-
er, these notions are too vague to be useful in the
present context. More usefully, various views endorse,
in different ways, the idea that autonomy is crucially
related to people’s reasoning, deliberative and evalua-
tive capacities. This relation between autonomy and
cognition is generally positive—greater reasoning, de-
liberation and evaluation typically leads to greater au-
tonomy. There are a number of ways one could cash
out the relationship between reasoning and autonomy
on different accounts. For simplicity of analysis, we
will focus on three: deductive/logical competence,
comprehension (including the avoidance of false be-
liefs), and critical analysis. The object of these capac-
ities can be both external (arguments and claims made
by others or evidence observed) and internal (one’s
own reasons, arguments, values, etc.).
We can see this common strain by attending to
several leading theories of autonomy. Consider first
hierarchical theories like Frankfurt’s, which are
(roughly) concerned with the coherence of higher-
order and lower-order desires. Strictly speaking, de-
sires are non-cognitive. However, reasoning capacities
can be crucial in resolving potential conflicts. In the
first place, some logical abilities will be needed to
recognize that there is a conflict in need of resolution.
An unwilling addict (a paradigmatic instance of failure
of hierarchical autonomy) must recognize the conflict
between the lower-order desire to consume some sub-
stance and the higher-order desire to cease consump-
tion of that substance (and comprehend the greater
importance of the higher-order desire) in order to begin
to overcome her condition.6 Further, attempting to
discern appropriate strategies for bringing one’s vari-
ous desires into line will require critical analysis of a
range of options. And more nuanced hierarchical the-
ories (e.g., [21]) note that autonomy requires certain
reflective, self-critical capacities that lie well within the
scope of potential cognitive enhancements.
Autonomy is even more naturally amenable to cog-
nitive enhancement on theories that focus on compe-
tence and individuality. The idea of competence,
though vaguely defined, is clearly linked to people’s
ability to reason—their ability to properly comprehend
the options ahead of them, evaluate different options,
deduce appropriate courses of action, weigh conse-
quences, etc. And independence of thought is not just
a matter of ignoring the opinions of others; it requires
individuals to have sufficiently developed capacities to
assess a wide range of topics and situations. The more
one can engage directly with some problem, rather than
rely on the perspective of others, the more one can
claim one’s ideas were generated autonomously.
It is also clear how cognitive improvements are a
boon to unified life-plan theories like Young’s. Forming
a coherent picture of one’s life requires a large comple-
ment of reasoning abilities such as adequate internal
reflection, accurate comprehension of the relevant facts
of one’s life, the ability to critically evaluate different
plans and deduce a course of action from relevant pre-
mises. The clearer and more discerning picture one has
of one’s life-plan, the better able one will be to enact that
plan. Furthermore, forming a broad-based life plan is a
complex organizational task. Reasoning can aid in plan-
ning, consideration of consequences and critical reflec-
tion of the various facets of one’s chosen approach. Such
improvements can help ensure that one’s chosen course
of life is truly one’s own.
On none of these views is reasoning and deliberative
capacity sufficient for or identical with autonomy. And
each view involves a slightly different way in which
5 This isn’t to deny that a strong case cannot also be made that
autonomy can be enhanced by other means, in line with some
particular account of autonomy (say, by enhancing moral sensi-
bility or self-control). But these ways of enhancing autonomy
will fall outside the overlapping consensus, and therefore likely
to be more controversial.
6 This is just a restatement of the familiar idea that the first step to
overcoming an addiction is recognizing one has a problem.
126 G.O. Schaefer et al.
reasoning abilities affect autonomy. Nevertheless, it is
reasonable to interpret each as implying that reasoning
and deliberation can contribute to autonomy. Converse-
ly, each view implies that inhibiting someone’s ability to
reason and deliberate would inhibit autonomy.
For those who hold the related view that reasoning
ability affects autonomy only insofar as there is a
threshold of reasoning ability necessary for someone
to be an autonomous agent, a modified approach can be
taken. Being brought above the threshold for autono-
my by improving one’s reasoning abilities would count
as an enhancement of autonomy, while being brought
below the threshold by inhibiting someone’s reasoning
ability would be an inhibition of autonomy. Where
precisely that threshold is will not be discussed here;
but as long as there is such a threshold, enhancing
autonomy by improving some beings’ reasoning abil-
ity will at least in principle be possible.7
Overlapping Consensus: The Case-Based Approach
If the preceding theory-based defense of the strong
relationship between reasoning capacity and autonomy
is unpersuasive, consider instead a case-based ap-
proach. Much of the debate over autonomy is centered
on making sense of a few paradigmatic cases of auton-
omy inhibition or violation, in order to be able to
determine whether autonomy was violated or inhibited
in non-paradigmatic cases. Here, we will highlight four
such cases: brainwashing, psychological manipulation,
deception, and lack of self-awareness. (See, e.g.,
[19–24, 26]) What is interesting about these cases is
that they operate internally. That is to say, they work by
affecting individuals’ internal psychology and ability
to reason properly. Brainwashing and psychological
manipulation aim at altering (fundamentally, in the
case of brainwashing) people’s beliefs and desires
through non-rational and (usually) non-consensual
means. Deception aims at creating false beliefs, there-
by inhibiting individuals’ ability to reason soundly. A
lack of self-awareness prevents people from attending
properly to their own beliefs, desires, interests, and so
on. Moreover, all these internal effects relate directly to
people’s ability to reason and deliberate properly. So,
even if one rejects the idea that most plausible concepts
of autonomy include the idea of reasoning capacity, in
practice, many paradigmatic autonomy violations cru-
cially involve inhibition of reasoning and deliberation.
There might be other ways to violate someone’s auton-
omy not related to reasoning and deliberation, but all
that is necessary for the present argument is to show
that many paradigmatic cases of autonomy inhibition
work by inhibiting reasoning and deliberation. Thus,
preventing such inhibitions by improving people’s rea-
soning and deliberation should have the effect of en-
hancing autonomy, insofar as there would be fewer
instances when one’s autonomy will be inhibited.8
Recognition of this common feature can help iden-
tify precise means by which autonomy could be plau-
sibly enhanced, without being committed to a particu-
lar (and likely controversial) conception of autonomy.
That is not to endorse a particular conception of auton-
omy as a certain capacity for reason; rather, such a
capacity is a relatively uncontroversial feature of
autonomy. Most will accept that reasoning capacity
is necessary for autonomy, and moreover that inhibi-
tion of such a capacity will generally inhibit autono-
my. Thus this overlapping consensus view of autono-
my suggests a broadly acceptable means of autono-
my enhancement: improving people’s reasoning abili-
ties, especially their abilities to resist deception and
7 One might reply that, as a matter of fact, relatively few people
are below the relevant threshold, so autonomy enhancement is
not relevant to the vast population. But such a view would
implausibly imply that very few acts of deception, manipulation,
restriction, and so on actually reduce autonomy. More generally,
this suggestion overlooks the extent to which a large variety of
factors such as internal biases and external distortions work to
reduce people’s ability to govern their own lives. For such a view
to be plausible, such influences should at least count as violations
of autonomy, even if they are not seen as literally reducing
autonomy. But this merely reframes the enhancement of auton-
omy as the prevention of autonomy violations (deception, ma-
nipulation, etc.), leaving our main argument intact. While we
will not focus on these alternative ways of conceiving of auton-
omy enhancement in this paper, our arguments should apply
mutatis mutandis to such proposals. We are grateful to a referee
for pressing us on these points.
8 It goes without saying that improvement in cognitive capacity
will often have different significance on different conceptions of
autonomy. But this isn’t a problem. In a similar way,
something—say deep personal relationships—will promote
well-being in very different ways on objective, desire-
satisfaction and hedonic conceptions of well-being. But if this
falls within the overlapping consensus, then these opposing
conceptions can all still agree that promoting deep relationships
is a good thing. Notice also that our claim about overlapping
consensus doesn’t assume that different accounts of autonomy
target a single unified phenomenon. We only claiming that they
can all agree that certain core features play an important role in
autonomy.
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manipulation.9 And, conversely, it implies a straightfor-
ward way that autonomy can be inhibited: impairing
someone’s general reasoning capacities.
It could be objected that we have overlooked how
improving reasoning could actually reduce autonomy.
One such case would involve decisional paralysis.
Perhaps by improving someone’s reflective and delib-
erative capabilities, they will engage overmuch in rea-
soning rather than making a decision. Insofar as this
inhibits decision-making, autonomy could plausibly be
impaired. This is a legitimate worry, and one that our
account can accommodate by accepting that there may
be an appropriate ‘mean’ of certain reasoning capaci-
ties. Above a certain level, some enhanced capacities
may indeed actually inhibit autonomy. Still, there is
some reason to think that, for most reasoning capaci-
ties, people are generally below the ideal mean. There
is not adequate space here to fully motivate that claim,
but running the reversal test [28] can help: would we
think it generally an improvement in autonomy to
reduce certain reasoning capacities? It seems unlikely
for the general population, but perhaps there are some
individuals who do indeed overthink things and thus
could have improved autonomy by reducing certain
deliberative inclinations. Moreover, it is important to
recognize that over-analyzing can itself be subject to
cognitive regulation. An integral part of proper reason-
ing (comprehension, in particular) is the capacity to
calculate the opportunity costs of further deliberation
on one issue and the ability to recognize when it is
appropriate to deliberate further, and for how long. If
that is the case, the proper solution is not be to simply
inhibit deliberation, but rather improve people’s ability
to calculate when deliberation is important to achiev-
ing their goals or values, and at what point it should be
foregone. Insofar as that helps avoids paralysis, it
would be another way to improve autonomy by im-
proving certain reasoning capacities.10
While we have attempted to remain neutral, for the
most part, between a number of popular competing
conceptions of autonomy, our account is to be sure not
completely neutral. In particular, the preceding discus-
sion did involve some evaluation of how different pro-
cesses affect reasoning ability and, in turn, autonomy.
These evaluations are not in themselves normative, but
if one takes the (widely-accepted) view that autonomy is
valuable, it does indeed have normative implications,
some of which are discussed below. This is a welcome
outcome—we take a roughly neutral stance towards
different notions of autonomy in order to put forward a
generally-acceptable account, rather than avoid particu-
lar normative judgments or implications.11
Cognitive Enhancement as Autonomy Enhancement
It is important to note that cognitive enhancement is not
necessarily the only way to enhance autonomy; other
interventions, such as the direct reduction of conformist
impulses or improving people’s imagination or creativity,
could, on various accounts, also improve autonomy, and
thereby make for an even stronger (but also more contro-
versial) case for autonomy enhancement. We focus on
cognitive enhancement because it is amenable to the
overlapping consensus we have developed, it is feasible,
and it ties in directly to some of the examples cited by those
who worry about autonomy violations in enhancement.
With this in mind, we are now in a position to explain
how cognitive enhancements can generally enhance au-
tonomy. Recall two related features of the overlapping
consensus on autonomy above: particular interventions
such as brainwashing, deception and manipulation inhibit
autonomy, and broader reasoning ability (including logi-
cal competence, comprehension and critical analysis) is a
crucial component of autonomy. Cognitive enhancement
shows significant promise both in improving the latter9 One could argue that there is strong overlapping consensus on
certain aspects of autonomy that do not relate directly to internal
mental functioning. For instance, coercion is frequently taken as
a paradigmatic case of autonomy inhibition, but it generally has
little to do with interfering with or altering someone’s mental
processes. But this view is not universally accepted; Benjamin
Sachs [27], for instance, has proposed that coercion is best
cashed out in terms of threats, not in terms of autonomy inhibi-
tion or violation. In any case, even if there are additional, widely-
agreed upon aspects of autonomy (such as immunity from coer-
cion), this does not militate against our case that enhancement
of autonomy via improvements to reasoning ability is quite
possible.
10 Notice, finally, that an increase in cognitive capacity needn’t
imply an increase in how often and how long one deliberates.
What it implies is that when one deliberates, that deliberation
would be improved in certain respects.
11 A related point applies to the suggestion, made to us by an
anonymous referee, that substantive normative assumptions
might be written into the very notion of improvement in cogni-
tive capacities such as the capacity for reasoning—perhaps
‘good reasoning’ cannot be understood in purely procedural
terms. Even if this is correct, this needn’t be a problem so long
as the relevant normative assumptions are widely shared.
128 G.O. Schaefer et al.
features and in helping resist such autonomy inhibiting
interventions; and insofar as it improves on those features,
it will also enhance autonomy. Now different autonomy
theorists might argue for different particular means by
which cognitive enhancement can lead to improvement
of autonomy; for instance, life-plan theorists may think
that memory enhancements will be relevant to autonomy
while hierarchical theorists ignore it. Still, our approach
brings various views into relatively close alignment, to the
point that even if disagreements in theory persist, practical
consensus over the use of some forms of cognitive en-
hancement to improve autonomy appears possible.
Furthermore, it may be that only certain aspects of
cognition will be relevant to the sort of reasoning central
to autonomy. Improving people’s ability to perform cer-
tain cognitive tasks such as carrying out complex math-
ematical equations or recalling the meanings of obscure,
infrequently-used terms (popular aspects of many stan-
dardized tests) would have little to dowith autonomy on a
number of accounts. However, other aspects of cognition
are more relevant.We have already discussed how logical
competence, a key aspect of cognition, plays an important
role in various accounts of autonomy. In addition, pattern
recognition assists in properly comprehending the way
the external world, as well as one’s own mind, functions.
Linguistic ability is needed to understand and communi-
cate with others, improving people’s ability to critically
analyze different opinions and views. Even improving
memory (a central focus of recent research on cognitive
enhancement; see, e.g., [29]) can ensure people have
correct comprehension of the world and themselves, an
important component of autonomy [30] that will again
improve deliberation and self-reflection.12 Improving
comprehension, and thus the accuracy of beliefs, is par-
ticularly important for autonomous choice. Autonomy
involves choice between options for what one judges
one ought to do. To appreciate the nature of options, we
need true beliefs about their nature. If you have inaccurate
beliefs about, for instance, living in England (say, you
think the climate is very pleasant and you like sunny
weather), you are not really choosing to live in England
because it is best for you.
There is also good reason to think that cognitive
enhancement can help mitigate some of the influences
that reduce autonomy. Psychological manipulation can
take a variety of forms, but at least one potential mech-
anism is through conformity: people adopt potentially
fallacious or misguided beliefs or desires not on their
own merits but in virtue of the beliefs and desires of the
surrounding community.13 One of the classic demonstra-
tions of this phenomenon comes from Asch [33] who
famously demonstrated that people can be made to give
obviously false answers to questions on subjects such as
the relative length of two lines when their peers give such
obviously false answers. A number of follow-up studies
have shown that greater intelligence is strongly correlat-
ed with resistance to conformity in such circumstances
[34–36]. Such resistance to conformity is not merely a
matter of expertise; those studies found that intelligence
is also correlated with lower conformity with the uncon-
ventional or counterintuitive normative opinions of one’s
peers. Nancy Rhodes and Wendy Wood have postulated
that higher intelligence impedes influence insofar as
more intelligent people have greater working knowledge
and “possess the ability to critically evaluate and reject
all but the most cogent messages” [37, p. 158]. If that is
the case, then cognitive enhancement would likely help
prevent at least some forms of manipulation (though of
course even the cognitively enhanced would likely still
be susceptible to manipulation to some degree) and
preserve independence of thought.14
12 As discussed in relation to reasoning above, increasing certain
cognitive functions beyond a certain optimal point may ultimately
compromise autonomy. For such an example in the context of mem-
ory, see Luria [31]. But it seems to us doubtful that most individuals
are beyond that point and so improving cognitive functions will, for
most people, be an improvement in autonomy. Relatedly, cognitive
enhancement may sometimes reduce autonomy by pushing people
even further in some mistaken direction—for example, if many of a
person’s basic beliefs are false, cognitive enhancement may just lead
her to develop a more elaborate false system of beliefs, which will in
turn reduce her autonomy. This, however, seems to us a weak argu-
ment against improving cognitive capacity to enhance autonomy—
otherwise this point would also cast doubt on the entire enterprise of
education. On the contrary, improved reasoning can be generally
expected to make beliefs more accurate, even if it sometimes leads
one astray. Our claim is, after all, not that cognitive improvements will
invariably enhance autonomy, just that they generally will. We are
grateful to an anonymous referee for pressing this point.
13 This is akin to what Mill had in mind when he emphasized the
importance of “originality” [32, p. 121]. Mill’s distinction be-
tween higher and lower pleasures is based on the comparison of
those who have experienced both. Mill also thought that vivid
imagination of alternatives was sufficient to make such a com-
parison (On Liberty, [32], p.10). This psychological capacity of
imagination also varies between individuals and could in princi-
ple be enhanced.
14 One relevant and intriguing consideration is the considerable
evidence that views and attitudes that appear to have a strong
genetic basis are also the most resistant to social pressures. See
Tesser [38].
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Unfortunately, as far as we are aware, similar studies
have not been carried out to test whether improved cog-
nitive capacities reduce vulnerability to deception. Still, it
stands to reason that cognitive enhancement would in fact
have a similar effect on susceptibility to deception. In the
very least, cognitive enhancement will promote the accu-
racy of people’s beliefs, which could subvert attempts by
others to instill contrary false beliefs. Moreover, improv-
ing reasoning capacities could help improve people’s
ability to effectively evaluate the claims of others and
recognize fallacious arguments. So, insofar as deception
and manipulation are inimical to autonomy (a claim
accepted by all the mainstream views on autonomy)
cognitive enhancements could be very effective means
of improving autonomy.
Somemight find this conclusion unsettling. It implies
that more intelligent people are more autonomous; one
might think that, therefore, we would be more justified
in making decisions on behalf of less intelligent people,
as their autonomy is diminished. This worry, however, is
mistaken. In the first place, most theories of autonomy
already admit of degrees—some adults are more auton-
omous than others, and each person more autonomous
at some times, in some circumstances. If this conclusion
is problematic for our view, it is also a problem for most
mainstream views of autonomy. Our view should not,
then, be any more disturbing than those views. Also,
while intelligence might improve autonomy, it is clearly
neither sufficient for nor the only factor that improves
autonomy. Moreover, differing levels of autonomy do
not justify differing levels of paternalism; the solution to
diminished autonomy is generally not to make decisions
on behalf of individuals, but instead to help them be
more autonomous in their decision-making—in other
words, to enhance their autonomy. This is one aim of
education, which is itself a cognitive enhancer, and the
commonest means by which autonomy is enhanced.15
As we have seen, cognitive enhancement generally
has the effect of enhancing autonomy.16 This finding is
interesting in itself and, when combined with the
widely-accepted value of autonomy, it also gives us
additional reason to pursue and promote biomedical
cognitive enhancement. And, as the next section will
show, it has the added advantage of being resistant to
several autonomy-based objections to enhancement.
We of course do not deny that environmental influ-
ences can make an important difference to cognitive
capacity (see, e.g., [40]), and thus also autonomy, if our
argument is correct. It is a further empirical question
whether biomedical means are feasible and efficacious
means to this end. But it is most likely that the best




As mentioned in the Introduction, a number of objec-
tions to biomedical enhancement have been raised in
the literature. Most of those objections would apply
with equal force against autonomy enhancement as
against interventions that did not enhance autonomy.
However, autonomy enhancement does bear directly
on one central objection: enhancement via embryonic
genetic manipulation17 violates the autonomy of the fu-
ture child.
Whether or not such autonomy-based objections are
sound for other forms of enhancement, using genetic
manipulation to enhance autonomy along the lines
discussed above can avoid, or at least blunt, their force.
Recent studies have made significant progress in iden-
tifying genes correlated with greater intelligence. (see,
e.g., [41–44]) Based on such findings parents may, in
15 One interesting implication of this view is the converse—just as
certain interventions that affect cognitive ability can enhance
autonomy, other interventions could inhibit it. For instance, one
might think it is important to make society more cooperative; one
means of doing so would be to increase people’s conformity and
susceptibility to social influence. While there may be beneficial
outcomes from such an intervention (such as greater provision of
public goods or less social strife), it is important to note it would
have significant costs as well, in terms of a diminishing of people’s
autonomy. Another example of autonomy-inhibiters would be
pollutants that cause cognitive defects, such as lead exposure
through water, paint and other sources [39]; in addition to the
health ramifications, one could raise the further objection that such
pollutants lead to long-term reduction of people’s autonomy.
16 Those who wish to emphasize that cognitive capacity isn’t on
its own sufficient for autonomy may prefer to instead speak of
enhancing opportunity for autonomy rather than autonomy itself.
But for our purposes here this distinction is unimportant.
17 These same critics also object to embryo selection for the
purpose of enhancement, but this view faces the non-identity
problem. If a couple selects one embryo over another, then
strictly speaking no individual’s autonomy could be violated.
For if they had not undergone the selection, then the selected-for
embryo would likely not have existed; and it is difficult to argue
that one would respect the autonomy of a future child by not
bringing him or her into existence. There is not space here to
address this issue thoroughly, and so we will set it aside.
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the near future, be able to use genetic manipulation to
improve people’s cognitive capacities—which, given
the above arguments, would lead to enhancement of
autonomy. Of course, genetic manipulation is not the
only way to enhance autonomy; other biomedical in-
terventions such as pharmaceuticals, or more tradition-
al means such as education, could have the effect.
However, genetic manipulation is worth focusing on
because it is uniquely controversial and at the center of
several authors’ concerns about enhancement.
We will now discuss how autonomy enhancement
can help address two objections to enhancement via
genetic manipulation, one concerning a child’s right to
an open future, and the other concerning subversion of
the process of autonomous self-directed formation of
traits.
The Open Future Objection
The first objection comes from Dena Davis, who
adapts Joel Feinberg’s conception of a child’s right to
an open future as an objection to certain kinds of
genetic enhancement.18 The right to an open future,
says Feinberg, is not an existent right, but rather a
right-in-trust; “The violating conduct guarantees now
that when the child is an autonomous adult, certain key
options will already be closed to him.” [45, p. 77] One
paradigmatic example of violating a child’s right to an
open future would be preventing the child from attend-
ing school, thus shutting off (or at least seriously
inhibiting) various career options that require a certain
basic level of education. Feinberg considers this to be a
sort of autonomy-right; while some autonomy theorists
might disagree about this classification, the right is at
least rather plausible. Indeed, preventing a child from
going to school also inhibits autonomy on our
overlapping consensus account as well, insofar as it
deprives the child of the intellectual resources that
contribute towards personal autonomy.
Davis [7, 8] expands Feinberg’s argument to cover
not only existent children, but potential children as
well—including embryos potentially the subject of
genetic manipulation. This argument does not assume
that embryos have any moral status; however, there is a
sense in which any future child resulting from genetic
manipulation has a right against parents taking actions
at any point—indeed, even before the child was
conceived—that would inhibit the child’s options later
in life. Thus, according to Davis, using genetic manip-
ulation to select for a disability like deafness violates
the child’s right to an open future insofar as such
manipulation inhibits the option to easily integrate into
the hearing community [7].19
This argument is vulnerable to a number of objec-
tions. Many non-objectionable parenting decisions al-
ter a child’s options in the same way, and choosing
between various mutually-exclusive options (where to
send a child to school, what clothes to buy, what food
to prepare, etc.) is inevitable [46]. It is not clear why
similar options-alteration via enhancement would be
especially problematic.
The argument becomes especially implausible in the
case of autonomy enhancement. The main plausible
options that are shut off by having more autonomy
(such as integration into a very manipulative commu-
nity or one that disvalues reasonable thought) seem
patently objectionable, even harmful, and could not
provide a serious reason against enhancing autonomy.
That is to say, the options that are shut off are not
particularly valuable—manipulative communities are
generally not worth joining. In addition, being auton-
omous is integral to taking full advantage of various
options; enhancing autonomy should directly promote
the number and value of a child’s options, not restrict
them. Even if increased autonomy remove a handful of
options (such as joining a community that disvalues
autonomy) from the menu, many more will be opened
up (more career opportunities, better management of
resources to obtain what one wants, and even greater
ability to discern how to integrate into a wide variety of
communities, etc.)
A more indirect way that genetic manipulation can
violate a child’s right to an open future is through the
creation of parental expectations and entitlements. Be-
cause genetic manipulation is, at present, somewhat
costly, parents who engage in such manipulation in
order to direct their children’s lives in a certain way
could reinforce and bolster parents’ unwillingness to
18 Davis focuses on genetic selection, but her arguments also
apply to genetic manipulation; we will address the latter for
reasons explained in the previous footnote, but our arguments
should apply mutatis mutandis to her concerns about genetic
selection.
19 As an anonymous reviewer has pointed out to us, one problem
with this example is that it might also be argued that being
hearing also limits one’s options by making it harder to integrate
into the deaf community.
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accept the child deviating from the selected life-plan
[8], see also [5]. Suppose, for instance, that parents
perform genetic manipulation in order to enhance their
child’s athletic ability, because they very much want
their child to be an elite athlete. While this enhance-
ment could be seen as opening up certain options
(improving the child’s ability to actually become an
elite athlete), the parents may also feel so invested in
the child’s athletic career that they would not tolerate or
accept the child choosing a different career path. The
enhancement, then, indirectly creates an environment
in which a child’s options are limited—what Sandel [5]
calls “hyper-parenting”.
Davis has similar worries about cognitive enhance-
ment: “Even traits that are useful for all life plans (such
as intelligence) may be chosen with very particular life
plans in mind, with expectations that may restrict the
child’s future freedom” [8, p. 26]. So, for example,
parents might choose to genetically enhance a future
child’s autonomy by making the child more immune to
manipulation and deception in order to prevent the
child from belonging to a political party they believe
to be particularly manipulative and deceptive. We
might worry that such investment creates an environ-
ment in which the parents would become even more
intolerant of any inclination the child might later have
to join such a political party, inhibiting the child’s
ability to join that political party.
Still, it is difficult to imagine such parents having a
specific life-plan in mind for their children in the first
place. The political party case mentioned above seems
rather unrealistic; the most plausible reason parents
would attempt to enhance their child’s autonomy is to
expand life-options, which can hardly be objection-
able. And even if the parents did have a specific life-
plan in mind, their commitment to the importance of
the capacities that underpin autonomy (evidenced by
the decision to enhance them) indicates a similar com-
mitment to tolerance of various options, thus minimiz-
ing the risk of restricting their child’s right to an open
future.
Even for parents who end up enhancing their child’s
autonomy as an unintended side-effect of cognitive
enhancement for other purposes, the case for an indi-
rect inhibition of the child’s right to an open future is
rather weak. Such enhancements will generally have
the direct effect of increasing, rather than decreasing, a
child’s options. In general, inhibitions and violations of
autonomy restrict options; they lead an individual to
unreflectively adopt a certain path, perhaps one deter-
mined by others, reducing a person’s ability to take
seriously alternatives that might, indeed, be better. By
reducing such restrictions, enhancement of autonomy
should open up a whole host of options that were not as
easily accessible before. In fact, it should help prevent
the sort of parental manipulation Davis is concerned
about; a child whose autonomy is enhanced will better
be able to resist the effects of the intolerance of his or
her parents’ expectations, and more likely to pursue his
or her own interests in spite of the parents’ plans—
even if the parents’ aim in seeking this biomedical
intervention had nothing to do with autonomy.20 More-
over, the risks of parental expectations constraining the
child’s future options have to be weighed against the
direct benefits of the enhancement on autonomy; in light
of the wide consensus over the value of autonomy
discussed above, it seems that autonomy will likely
weigh very heavily indeed.
The Communicative Objection
The second objection comes from Jurgen Habermas, in
The Future of Human Nature [6]. This objection is
intimately related to Habermas’ more general moral
and political focus on the importance of communica-
tion and discourse. It also finds its roots in Kantian
moral theory, premised on the idea that people must be
treated as an end in themselves, never merely as a
means. Habermas extends this thought to the process
by which an individual is formed: it is also important,
he argues, that people not be instrumentalized (treated
merely as a means) via genetic manipulation. This
instrumentalization is contrasted with a communica-
tive process, which involves the ability to assent or
dissent to (and critically engage with) whatever inter-
vention is being proposed. The upshot is that inculca-
tion of values and expectations is permissible, so long
as adequate space is given for the child to reflect on
such inculcation and guide the direction of his or her
own intellectual growth. Autonomy, then, is crucial to
people’s very identity and sense of self.
20 This claim should not be taken too far. An extremely control-
ling or manipulative parent will likely be able to find ways to
inhibit a child’s autonomy no matter how much cognitive en-
hancement has been employed. The point here is just that cog-
nitive enhancement can provide some resistance to these
attempts.
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Genetic manipulation is seen as problematic be-
cause it occurs prior to the child being able to engage
with and provide input on the intervention. According
to Habermas,
“Eugenic interventions aiming at enhancement re-
duce ethical freedom insofar as they tie down the
person concerned to rejected, but irreversible inten-
tions of their parties, barring him from the sponta-
neous self-perception of being the undivided author
of his own life” [6, p. 63].
Genetic manipulation violates autonomy not only
because it restricts certain options, but also because the
child himself or herself had no input or communicative
engagement with that restriction. This in turn inhibits
the autonomous formation of the child’s identity,
which Habermas takes to be of great importance.21
Habermas does, however, make an important conces-
sion: he accepts that genetic manipulation in order to
prevent grave illnesses in future children may be per-
missible because it is reasonable to presume that the
resultant child would agree to the procedure.22
It is true that genetic manipulation is undertaken
without the communicative input of the child, thus
precluding the possibility of discursive engagement
that Habermas takes to be crucial. And such commu-
nicative engagement with even young children is in-
deed important. Failing to engage in such communica-
tion with one’s children might inhibit autonomy on our
account as well, insofar as such would fail to properly
cultivate the child’s reflective and deliberative capaci-
ties; and similarly, any genetic manipulation aimed at
preventing that communicative process later on would
be difficult to justify.
Yet, genetic manipulation seems far less problemat-
ic when the manipulation is undertaken in order to
enhance autonomy. In Habermas’s own view, autono-
my is central to human agency. Moreover, enhance-
ment of autonomy via improved cognitive abilities
would improve the child’s ability to communicatively
engage with the world. So, for instance, by making
someone more self-aware and cognizant of the various
factors that influence them, they will be better able to
guide and direct their own growth.23 And even if
Habermas were still reluctant to endorse the positive
promotion of autonomy, it is harder to see how he
would resist interventions aimed at reducing violations
of autonomy. Indeed, enhancing autonomy would be a
powerful weapon against instrumentalization, insofar
as it could prevent people from having a distorted view
of the world and themselves. As Habermas takes the
capacity to personally engage with and provide input
into the factors that shape one’s life to be so central, he
should embrace autonomy enhancements as a useful
tool to improve that capacity.24
Furthermore, Habermas accepts that some prenatal
interventions, such as those that promote health, are
acceptable because of hypothetical consent: it is rea-
sonable to assume that the child would endorse health
improvements, as such would not conflict with any
reasonable life-plan. Hypothetical consent would argu-
ably also apply to autonomy enhancements—it seems
to us similarly implausible to expect that a child would
want a less-autonomous life. Otherwise, Habermas’s
general autonomy-based arguments against other pre-
natal enhancements would lose its force. After all, if
the resultant person would be perfectly fine with hav-
ing less autonomy throughout their lives, that person
would in effect be rejecting the fundamental value that
Habermas attributes to autonomous self-discovery.
That person would then be rejecting Habermas’s view
that takes such autonomous self-discovery as essen-
tial, making Habermas’s other arguments against
enhancement that rely on that view inapplicable to
21 Sandel [5] has somewhat similar concerns about the excessive
control genetic manipulation affords parents over their children;
however, he identifies the problem as less about inhibiting chil-
dren’s autonomous formation and more about parental rejection
of children’s given natures.
22 Habermas limits his objections to third-party prenatal en-
hancements. However, Peter Herissone-Kelly [47] has argued
that the thrust of Habermas’s argument (enhancement interferes
with self-discovery and self-formation) applies to adult self-
enhancement as well, insofar as self-enhancements undermine
the reflexive agency that makes many activities valuable.
23 This improvement in self-awareness is a natural outgrowth of
improved reasoning abilities. Having an understanding of where
one’s ideas and beliefs come from requires assessment of causal
influences and psychological function. While enhancements can-
not simply impart that understanding directly, they can assist
people’s ability to analyze the relevant factors.
24 Habermas might reply that the benefits to autonomy are
beside the point; genetic manipulation is problematic because
it is a form of unidirectional socialization, which inherently
and problematically alters the child’s identity. However, such
unidirectional socialization should only be problematic if it
ultimately limits the child’s ability to engage with and shape
his or her identity. Autonomy enhancements have the opposite
effect—even if they are unidirectional, they should ultimately
enable and promote rather than restrict the self-formation of
identity.
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this particular individual.25 To be sure, a given child
might (hypothetically) instead reject the notion that a
particular intervention like cognitive enhancement actu-
ally improves autonomy—but if our arguments above
are correct, this would not in general be a reasonable
judgment. It might appear problematic that we impose
our own judgments of what is reasonable on future
children, but Habermas does precisely the same thing
in allowing for medical prenatal treatments.26
The Kantian undertones of Habermas’s arguments
might elicit the following reply: one cannot justify
violating someone’s autonomy on the basis that the
violation would overall promote the autonomy of that
individual, just as one cannot justify lying to someone
on the basis that the lying would (let us suppose)
promote the ability of that individual to see through
lies in the future. This reflects the idea that autonomy
is, first and foremost, to be respected—even if such
respect inhibits the promotion of autonomy.
However, it is not clear that genetic manipulation
aimed at enhancing autonomy would count as a violation
at all, even on Habermas’s account. In the first place,
Habermas is not (or at least, should not be) primarily
concernedwith present autonomy-rights as such, but with
the effect of a given intervention on a resultant child’s
ability to shape his or her own life. This approach makes
sense in the present case because embryos are not yet
autonomous agents—the embryo will only develop the
necessary capacities in the future. The issue is thus not
about violating the rights of an autonomous agent at the
time of the intervention but about limiting/expanding the
autonomy of an agent in the future.27 In Habermasean
terms, autonomy is limited when a certain (post-
natal) communicative process is inhibited. Even sup-
posing a categorical prohibition on any reduction in
the communicative process, autonomy enhancement
should be permitted because (as we argue) that com-
municative process is actually promoted all things
considered, rather than inhibited. It is true that the
decision to prenatally enhance autonomy is not itself
the result of communicative engagement, but that
decision will promote many more opportunities for
future communicative engagement (along the lines
outlined in the first part of this paper). And, in any
event, the decision to decline or even prohibit au-
tonomy enhancement would similarly not be the
result of a communicative process with the resultant
child—no matter what, the parent must make a
decision without input from the resultant child, and
it is surely better to choose the option that results in
more autonomy.
Furthermore, arguing for the strict primacy of an
autonomy right against prenatal enhancement over
the promotion of autonomy (and, in turn, the com-
municative process) would undermine the force of
the communicative argument, which takes personal
control and freedom to be a central value. To hold
that even if a given prenatal intervention leads to a
vast improvement in a child’s ability to direct and
shape his or her own life, that intervention should
still be prohibited seems to undermines the notion
that such self-direction is really of such great
importance.28
As we have said before, education is one kind of
cognitive enhancer that promotes autonomy. This is, to
some degree, imposed on young children without com-
municative dialogue. Habermas does not object to
(properly designed) education programs, and rightly
so because education is crucially important for the
development of autonomy, respecting and promoting
the communicative process. But by the same token,
Habermas should not object to prenatal interventions
that would improve autonomy—including, as we have
argued, cognitive enhancements.
25 We can perhaps conceive of individuals who deeply desire to be
enslaved by others, but it is doubtful that respect for autonomy should
make us respect such slavishwishes, or thatwe should treat a life plan
organized around such desires as any more reasonable than a con-
ceivable life plan organized against the desire to be sick and infirm.
More reasonably, some might value (say) a life without complex
choices even if it is not very autonomous. But even then, increased
reasoning/cognition would help people figure out how to ‘simplify’
their lives most effectively and so would still be worth having.
26 One might think it is just not sensible to think anyone could
object to prenatal health interventions. However, that is actually
a distinct possibility—Davis [7], for instance, was motivated in
part by the aim of some disabled couples to have children who
are similarly disabled. Or to use a more extreme example, an
anorexic may regret that her parents did genetically intervene
prenatally so that she would be even thinner.
27 Feinberg’s [45] open future account explicated above is an
attempt to conceptualize autonomy violations for future individ-
uals. If a defender of Habermas attempts this route, though, our
preceding responses to Davis will also apply just as strongly.
28 Notice, moreover, that even if we are wrong about this, and
prenatal autonomy enhancement does violate some right, it
doesn’t follow that it is morally forbidden. It might be a very
slight violation of rights, vastly outweighed by the benefit in
autonomy—the very value this right is claimed to protect. Few
hold the view that telling a toddler a little white lie is forbidden in
all contexts.
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Conclusions
While discussion of enhancement has largely focused
on more easily-measurable domains such as cognition
or health, in this paper we have sought to draw atten-
tion to another important potential domain of enhance-
ment: autonomy. It should be clear that, on virtually
any mainstream view of autonomy, autonomy can po-
tentially be enhanced. By identifying a general consen-
sus that reasoning ability contributes to autonomy, we
further showed how cognitive enhancements (some of
which are currently available) can constitute autonomy
enhancement as well.
On this basis, we were then able to argue that those
who object to enhancement because it inhibits autono-
my should nevertheless support, or at least not oppose,
the enhancement of autonomy. Habermas, for instance,
worries that certain forms of enhancement run afoul of
autonomy by barring a person from “the spontaneous
self-perception of being the undivided author of his
own life” [6, p. 63]. However, we have argued that
even on the conceptions of autonomy (such as self-
authorship) that critics of enhancement endorse, it is
possible to have enhancements that promote autonomy
and thus avoid their critiques.
There has generally been strong support for the
enhancement of autonomy in traditional ways. Educa-
tion, in particular, is a popular way to improve people’s
ability to reason and thereby govern their own lives.
Support for education naturally follows from a strong
belief in the value of autonomy. But if our arguments
above are correct, similar considerations should also
motivate support for novel forms of cognitive enhance-
ment, and reasoning improvement more generally, as a
way of promoting autonomy.29 Thus, critics of en-
hancement who take autonomy to be the main reason
to resist enhancement programs have reason to not
only permit but even support and promote various
forms of autonomy enhancement, including enhance-
ment of reasoning capacities. There is not space here to
investigate what forms this promotion might take, but
it could include promotion of and funding for research
on autonomy enhancement, subsidies (as with public
education) for autonomy enhancements, and publically
encouraging people to voluntarily undergo such en-
hancements themselves, as a way to live more autono-
mous lives.
This paper has reflected a general strategy available
to proponents of human enhancement: if a sweeping
objection to biomedical enhancement is based on the
worry that enhancement will compromise some value,
and it can be shown that this value can itself be pro-
moted using biomedical means, then at the very least
these forms of enhancement should be prima facie
immune to this objection.30 Here, we filled in ‘auton-
omy’ for ‘some value’, and so were able to respond to
one sort of objection to enhancement. The same strat-
egy could potentially be used to respond to other ob-
jections to enhancement. For instance, we could fill in
‘X’ with Sandel’s [5] concern, humility in the face of
the given. Even if Sandel is right that enhancement in
general goes against that humility, he will find it far
more difficult to reject enhancements aimed at making
people more humble and appreciate life as a gift. We
hope that further discussions along this line can help
advance the enhancement debate and perhaps over-
come some of the seemingly-irreconcilable disputes
in the literature.
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